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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on The Utah Court Of Appeals by §78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah 
Code (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue. 1- Whether the trial court erred in awarding support to appellee, a registered nurse 
who is able bodied and whose children are almost all in school, based upon her imputed 
income working only 72 hours a month, rather than working at full time employment. 
Standard of Review. Abuse of Discretion. "We review this application of findings to 
statutory law for an abuse of discretion." Kelley v. Kelley, 79 P.3d 428, 429 (Utah App. 
2003). "We will not overturn a trial court's alimony ruling as long as the court supports 
its ruling with adequate findings and exercises its discretion according to the standards 
we have set." Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court's abuse of discretion was caused by an error in law, because the 
court did not follow the statutory directions of §§78-45-7.5(7) and 30-3-5(8) UTAH CODE 
(2004). A "question of statutory construction [is] reviewed for correctness." Mancil v. 
Smith, 18 P.3d 509, 511 (Utah App. 2000). "Questions about the legal adequacy of 
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues of law, 
which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." Van Dyke v. 
Van Dyke, 86 P.3d 767, 769 (Utah App. 2004). "Proper interpretation of a statute 
presents questions of law which we review for correctness." Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 
176 (Utah App. 2000). 
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Preservation. Appellant argued at closing that support should be based upon Appellee's 
ability to work and support herself "to the best of their ability", based upon "Cummings v. 
Cwmromgs.821P2d480and^ 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
§30-3-5(8) UTAH CODE (2004) 
§§78-45-3; 78-45-4 UTAH CODE (2004) 
§78-45-7.5(6) and (7) UTAH CODE (2004) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After numerous hearings for temporary matters, trial on this divorce was held on 
April 2, 2004, Judge Paul Lyman presiding. After more lengthy litigation, objections, 
and motions for relief, the final amended findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
amended decree of divorce were filed on March 17, 2005, effective as of July 8, 2004. 
Notice of this appeal was filed April 8, 2005.x 
This case was randomly assigned to mediation, which was unsuccessful. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties had an 18-year marriage and five daughters, who were ages 16, 14, 10, 
7 and 4, at the time of trial. R. 613:177:21. The youngest child, nearly age 5 at the time 
of trial, attended preschool, and was scheduled to start public school in August 2004 [trial 
was in April 2004]. R 613:216:7-8; 613:284:19-21. Father is a Public Health 
1
 Since the date of the entry of the amended decree, the parties have participated in a 
subsequent Order to Show Cause, but none of the issues discussed there are relevant to 
this appeal. 
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Officer/Executive Director. R 613:70:1. Mother had been primarily a stay at home 
parent who had some work history. R 613:72:15-16; 613:75:3-7. She had worked in a 
group home and as a nurse intermittently during the entire marriage, between having 
children, in both Massachusetts and Utah. R. 613:72:15-16; 613:74:16-17. During the 
marriage Father paid for and supported Mother through school to obtain a decree as a 
Registered Nurse and later as a Massage Therapist. R 613:73:9-17; 613:75:20-613:76:10. 
Mother has maintained both her nursing and massage therapy licenses by working and 
maintaining Continuing Education requirements. Id. Mother testified she wanted the 
additional education and training so that she would be able to take care of herself if she 
were ever a single parent. R 613: 225:5-7. Prior to trial, Mother had worked about one 
or two shifts a month as a nurse at the local hospital. R 613:132:17-21; 613: 190:24-25; 
613:191:12. There was work available for nurses in the area at a starting salary of $16.60 
per hour. R 613:62:8; 613:64:10; 613:68:8, 22-24. 
The court imputed income to Mother based on 72 hours a month at $16.60 an hour 
as a nurse. R 613:285:9-19. The court made no finding regarding the costs of daycare, 
other than that both parents, and Father's parents, could provide daycare for the children, 
before surrogate care should be used. R 613:292:7-8: 613:292:17-22: 613:293:7-15. No 
evidence was presented to claim mother has any physical or mental limitations precluding 
her full time employment. There is no evidence of unusual emotional or physical needs 
of the children, which require the custodial parent to be at home. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Alimony should be based upon the "needs of the recipient spouse" and her 
"earning capacity or ability to produce income" before the court looks to "the ability of 
the payor spouse to provide support". §30-3-5(8)(a)(ii) and (iii) UTAH CODE (2004); 
Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 179 (Utah App. 2000). The court found that mother was 
capable of earning $16.60 per hour as a registered nurse and that nurses were needed in 
the area of the parties' residence. R. 613:284:3. The court took judicial notice of the fact 
that nurses often work 12-hour shifts, at least in a hospital setting. R. 613:285:16. There 
is no legal reason articulated by the court that mother should not be imputed income for 
full-time employment, or at least three 12-hour shifts per week, (36 hours per week) at 
the $16.60 per hour, rather than six 12-hour shifts per month (72 hours per month). 
At 36 hours per week that nurses often work, rather than the standard 40-hour 
week most people work, mother's income would be $2,590 per month ($16.60 X 36 
hours X 52 weeks divided by 12 months). This is more than twice the $1,200 a month 
imputed by the trial court. R. 613:285:19. It is unreasonable and contrary to Utah law to 
require support from a former spouse without first considering all of the recipient 
spouse's ability to produce income. §30-3-5(8)(a)(ii) UTAH CODE (2004) 
Rather or not preschoolers exist, this does not provide a legal basis not to impute 
income, based upon a full time wage to the mother, as she clearly has the ability to do so 
here. The court found that mother "still has a pre-school aged child for which she ought 
to be able to provide care" and "consequently the court is not going to order her to work 
2
 A 40-hour week at $16.60 per hour equals $34,528 annually, or $2,877 per month. 
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full-time". R. 613:284:6-8. However, no exceptions to full time imputed income exist, 
as set forth in section 75-45-7.5(7)(d) UTAH CODE (2004). 
The exceptions are if childcare costs approach or exceed income, the parent is 
physically or mentally unable to work, the parent is engaged in training for basic job 
skills, or the child has needs requiring the parent's presence. §78-45-7.5(7)(d)(i)-(iv) 
UTAH CODE (2004). The cost of childcare for the one pre-school age child does not 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn. This was never 
argued and was not even a factor the court considered. The court based its decision on 
the fact that a pre-school aged child was at home for a few more months; however, that is 
not an exception to the requirement to impute full time employment to mother. The other 
exceptions are not relevant. 
Further, even if the court determines that mother's imputed income was based on a 
relevant consideration, it should have been adjusted for after the child enters school in a 
few months, to reflect the extra time available to Mother for full time employment. 
Alimony was ordered for the length of the marriage and this is a circumstance foreseen at 
the time of the divorce; therefore, this issue would not be eligible for modification later. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MOTHER HAS GREATER ABILITY TO SUPPORT HERSELF 
In awarding support in a divorce, which generally includes child support to a 
custodial parent and alimony to a recipient spouse, the court must first determine the 
needs and gross income available to the respective parties. See, §§30-3-5(a)(i)-(iii); 78-
45-7.3 UTAH CODE (2004); Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 964 (Utah App. 1994) ("child 
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support obligations are fixed in proportion to the adjusted gross incomes of the parents."). 
The trial court did not include all income available to the appellee before determining the 
appropriate amounts for child support and alimony. 
"Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under subsection (7)." §78-
45-7.5(6) UTAH CODE (2004). "Income may not be imputed to a parent unless . . . a 
finding [is] made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed [or] underemployed." §78-
45-7.5(6) UTAH CODE (2004). The legislature has identified the factors to consider in 
imputing income. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probably earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the 
same occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics 
maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is 
unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage 
for a 40-hour workweek. To impute a greater income, the judge . . . shall 
enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
§78-45-7.5(7) UTAH CODE (2004) (emphasis added). 
In this case, at the time of the divorce, appellee was unemployed, though she had 
been employed in the recent past, on a part-time basis, as a nurse, one or two shifts a 
month. R 613:132:17-19; 613191:11-12. She had received training during the marriage 
as a massage therapist and as a registered nurse. R 613:75:11-22. Appellant paid for 
this training and also supported appellee in her schooling, in many ways, including by 
helping with the children while appellee attended class. R 613:75:3-7. Both parties 
testified she obtained such training in order to support herself and her children in the 
event that became necessary. R 613:75:11-13; 613:225:5-7; 613:233:21-23. 
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Appellee worked in a group home and as a nurse intermittently during the entire 
marriage, between having children, in both Massachusetts and Utah. R. 613:72:15-16; 
613:74:16-17. Appellee has maintained both her nursing and massage therapy licenses 
by working and maintaining Continuing Education requirements. R 613:73:9-17. There 
was work available as a nurse, in the geographic area in which appellee resided. R 
613:62:8; 613:64:10; 613:68:8, 22-24. 
The court made a finding that, based upon her "work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for similar persons in the community," appellee 
was capable of working as a registered nurse at the entry level wage of $16.60 an hour. R 
613:284:3. However, the court concluded that because mother "still has a pre-school 
aged child for which she ought to be able to provide care" . . . "consequently the court is 
not going to order her to work full-time". R. 613:284:6-8. Instead the court imputed 
monthly gross income to appellee of $1,200.00, based upon 72 hours a month, at the 
$16.60 hourly rate (or $1,195.20). R 613:285:8-19. 
The relevant statute provides that income should be imputed based upon work 
history, occupation qualifications and prevailing earnings, all of which the court did. 
§78-45-7.5(7)(b) UTAH CODE (2004). However, it also provides that income should be 
imputed for "at least" a "40-hour work week". §78-45-7.5(7)(c) UTAH CODE (2004). 
Appellee's ability to meet her needs is significantly increased if she were working full 
time, as opposed to 72 hours a month. Forty weekly hours of $16.60 hourly income 
totals $2,877.33 a month, approximately 240% more than the $1,200 monthly income 
concluded and imputed by the trial court. 
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Though it may be more convenient for appellee to work part time, the statute 
provides that it is the duty of every woman to "support her child and every child shall be 
presumed to be in need of the support of his mother." §78-45-4 UTAH CODE (2004). 
While appellant might also like to spend more time with the children and less time at 
work, there is no distinction between the mother's and the father's obligations to support 
their children. See, §78-45-3 UTAH CODE (2004). Further, the "recipient's earning 
capacity or ability to produce income" shall be considered in determining alimony. §30-
3-5(8)(a)(ii) UTAH CODE (2004). "Capacity" means "a measure of this ability . . . the 
maximum or optimum amount of production." The American Heritage Dictionary 199 
Houghton Mifflin Co. (1980). This is distinguishable from "convenience", which means 
"personal comfort; material advantage." Id. "Utah's clear policy is to require both 
parents to support their child to the extent that each is financially able." Mancil v. Smith, 
18 P.3d 509, 511 (Utah App. 2000)(citations omitted). While it may be more convenient 
for appellee to work only 17 hours a week, Utah law requires that each parent work to 
"the extent that each is financially able." Id. 
In a previous case, this court upheld a trial court's imputation of income to a 
mother based upon her qualifications, historical earnings, and a 40-hour workweek. In 
Cummings v. Cummings, the income information provided to the court by Ms. Scott was 
confusing and contradictory. Evidently she had held several different part time jobs of 
varying income amounts prior to the divorce. Ultimately, "the trial court imputed Ms. 
Scott's income as her historical earnings of $ 6.70 an hour on a fulltime basis. Utah Code 
72 hours a month calculates to approximately 17 hours per week. 
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Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (Supp. 1990) provides that imputed income is to be based upon 
'employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community.'" Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 480 (Utah App. 1991). 
This position is consistent with that of other states with similar statutory 
requirements. See, Roppe v. Roppe, 64 P.3d 1145 (Ore. App. 2003) (when wife, 39 in 
good health, had nothing to prevent her from acquiring full-time work that would allow 
her to earn higher monthly income than she was earning at time of dissolution hearing, 
court stepped down support to encourage the dependent spouse to become more 
financially independent and self-supporting); People v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 478 
(Colo. 2003)(C.R.S. 2004, income is defined as "actual gross income of a parent, if 
employed to full capacity, or potential income, if unemployed or underemployed"); 
Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 24 P.3d 523, 530 (Alaska 2001)(purpose of allowing court to 
impute income is to discourage parent form shirking obligation to support one's children 
and to encourage underemployed parent to work at full capacity for benefit of the 
children . . . "An important reason—if not the chief reason—for imputing income to a 
voluntarily underemployed parent is to goad the parent into full employment by attaching 
an unpleasant consequence (a mounting child support debt or, in certain cases of shared 
custody, a reduced child support payment) to continued inaction.").; In re Marriage of 
Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 301 (2001)(express statutory provision gives trial 
courts discretion to impute income to a parent based on earning capacity (§ 4058, subd. 
(b).)); Boutz v. Donaldson, 38 P.3d 203 (NM App. 2001)(when evaluating claim of 
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parental underemployment, trial courts must determine whether parent has "acted in good 
faith to earn to preserve as much money to support her [or his] children as could 
reasonably be expected under the circumstances); Little v. Little, 969 P.2d 188 (Ariz. 
App. 1998)( "[t]he obligation to pay child support is primary and other financial 
obligations are secondary.") 
The evidence presented is that appellee is capable of earning $16.60 an hour, on a 
full time basis. There is nothing in the record, which provides any support for the 
conclusion that she could only work approximately 17 hours a week instead of forty 
hours, like any other full time employee, including the appellant/father. This is especially 
true in this case, where appellant is the one who paid for appellee to receive her nursing 
training and supported her during that training. R 613:75:3-7. Further, the record does 
show that nursing work is frequently on 12-hour shifts and is available on evenings and 
the weekends, when appellant is available for childcare purposes. R 613:285:14-17. The 
court indicated it was "structuring this also to show that she could try to work weekends". 
R 613:292:2-4. Fortunately for the children in this case, the impact of appellee working 
full time would be less than in many scenarios because of the varying shifts available for 
appellee's occupation, and appellant's close proximity for the children. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE STATUTE 
The statute on imputing income does provide for some exceptions to imputing full 
time income to a parent. However, none of the statutory exceptions apply in this case. 
The exceptions are as follows: 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
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(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor 
children approach or equal the amount of income the 
custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. §78-45-7.5(7)(d) 
UTAH CODE (2004). 
There was no claim that exceptions (ii) or (iii) apply. Appellee has already 
received her training and made no claim of any physical or mental limitations, which 
would affect her ability to work full time. The claim by appellee was that she has one 
child, age 4, who was attending pre-school, at the time of the trial. R 613:216:7; 
613:216:7-8. Also, appellee claimed that the children, five daughters, were involved in 
numerous extra-curricular activities that necessitated her availability for transportation 
and other purposes. R 613:205:7-8. The court only recognized the claim regarding the 
existence of the one "pre-school aged child for which she ought to be able to provide 
care" and "consequently the court is not going to order her to work full-time". R. 
613:284:6-8. 
While the court believed that appellee "ought to be able to provide care" for this 
pre-school child, there are two problems with this conclusion. First, the desire to provide 
personal childcare for a pre-school age child, after a divorce, is not a legal basis to 
decrease the amount of imputed income. There was no demonstrated unusual emotional 
or physical need of the child, which requires the custodial parent's presence in the home. 
§78-45-7.5(7)(d)(iv) UTAH CODE (2004). 
11 
Second, there is no actual finding or basis to conclude that appellee's full time 
work would significantly diminish the amount of time appellee would have with the 
child, since the court made a finding that mother could work most shifts on the weekends, 
when father is available. R 613:285:21-613:286-4. In fact, during the marriage, this was 
the practice, that father helped with the children while mother was at school or work. R. 
614:76:2-3. While appellee may have to work one other day a week on a weekday, that 
is much preferable to the full time day care that many divorced parents experience, and is 
not as significant a decrease in her time with the child. 
Based upon the language in both relevant statutes in title 30 and title 78, support 
should be calculated based upon income imputed to the appellee at full time employment 
as a nurse at $16.60 per hour. 
III. FUTURE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN 
ANY CURRENT ALIMONY AWARD 
The court recognized in its findings that the pre-school age child would be going 
to school in August 2004, which was within five months of the date of trial, April 2004. 
R 613:284:19-21. In fact, the final Amended Decree was not actually entered until 
March of 2005. R 518. If this court were to allow the trial court the discretion to 
decrease the amount of appellee's imputed income based upon the finding that she 
"ought to be able to provide care" for her pre-school aged child, there should also be a 
provision for an increase when the child is no longer a pre-school-aged child. 
While the appellee could argue that appellant is free to file a petition to modify the 
divorce decree at the time the child enters school, this is not a viable option. In order to 
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modify a decree of divorce, appellant must show that there has been a "substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Bolliger v. 
Bolliger, 997 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah App. 2000). 
Here, the divorce clearly identifies that the parties have a pre-school age child, for 
whom the court believes appellee should be available for childcare. It is obviously 
foreseeable at this time that appellee will be available to work more hours when the child 
eventually goes to school, as the record reflects that the pre-school age child is identified 
as nearly five years old and going to kindergarten in the fall of 2004. R.613:285:16-21. 
While appellant does not believe that the trial court's desire to make appellee more 
available for day care of this pre-school age child, is in accordance with established Utah 
law, in the event the appellate court affirms that portion of the decision, it should identify 
when the appellee should have full time income imputed for purposes of calculating 
support. This calculation should be completed within the divorce decree itself, since this 
is an action that is foreseeable now and, therefore, would not be a requisite change of 
circumstances for modification of the decree at a later time. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to follow the law as clearly set forth 
in the statutes in title 30 and 78. It is clear that appellee has the training, health, and 
ability to earn $2,877 per month working as a registered nurse. There are no statutory 
exceptions or other basis to avoid imputing full time income. In the alternative, the court 
should account for the increase in the appellee's discretionary time after the pre-school 
aged child attends school, and impute full time income as of that date. Based upon the 
13 
foregoing facts and argument, appellant respectfully prays that this court reverse the trial 
court on this issue, and order that support in this divorce be re-calculated, based upon 
appellee's income in the amount of $2,877 per month. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 day of January 2006. 
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C. 
fyW_>K.y. 
OKIE D. FOWLKE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Addendum 1 
LORIE D. FOWLKE, 6875 
PAUL WALDRON 7660 
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C. 
2696 No. University Ave., Ste. 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT RESENDES, : 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Petitioner, : AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
TAMARA JOY RESENDES, : Case No. 024600138 
Judge: Paul Lyman-
Respondent. (<. c L , J^clB-
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 2nd day of April, 2004, the Honorable 
Judge Paul D. Lyman presiding. The Respondent appeared in person and was represented by her 
attorney, Douglas L. Neeley. The Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by his 
attorney, Lorie D. Fowlke. The Court, having received and accepted the parties' partial 
stipulation, having received the sworn testimony of witnesses and other evidence, having heard 
argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters 
the following: 
1. Both Petitioner and Respondent are bona fide residents of Sevier County, State of 
Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent were married on July 2, 1986, in the City of Salt Lake, 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and are presently married. 
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties have experienced irreconcilable 
differences that have prevented the parties from pursuing a viable marriage relationship. 
4. There have been five (5) children born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Melissa 
Joy, born January 13, 1988; Elysha Briana, born May 4, 1990; Lauren Taylor, born September 
13, 1994; Aubriana Tess, born April 1, 1997; and Annaliese Corrine, born July 14, 1999. 
5. The court adopts and incorporates the orders regarding custody and visitation 
from the Order Pursuant to Stipulation (Hearing Date: September 15, 2003) wherein the parties 
are awarded the joint legal custody of the partie's minor children. The Respondent shall be 
designated as the primary residential parent for the children in regards to parenting time. 
6. The Petitioner is entitled to parenting time pursuant to the statutory guidelines, which 
includes every other weekend, mid-week visits and alternating holidays. 
a. Special Days. The parties' stipulated and the Court orders up to eight (8) potential 
additional "special visitation" or "special event" days. These additional days shall be at the direction 
of the Special Master. 
b. Lunch Dates with Dad. Petitioner is awarded alternating lunch with one (1) of the 
children at school, so long as it does not interfere with the school curriculum. If Petitioner plans to 
2 
remove that child from the school during the lunch hour for a special lunch, he should notify the 
Respondent prior to doing so. 
c Telephone Contact with Children. The non-custodial parent shall be entitled to 
reasonable telephone contact with the minor children. During the school year and Respondent's one-
half summer blocks, Petitioner shall be entitled to call the children a couple times per week (2-3). 
However, all phone calls shall be prior to 9:00 p.m. and should be of a reasonable duration. 
Likewise, Respondent shall be entitled to this same telephone contact with the minor children during 
those times that the children are with Petitioner for his one-half summer blocks. The children shall 
be entitled to call either parent at any time as they desire and neither party shall prohibit or limit the 
children from doing so. In addition, if Petitioner so desires, he may purchase a cell phone for the 
exclusive use of the children so that they may contact him whenever or wherever they may be. 
d. Events of Children. Each party shall be ordered to notify the other parent in 
advance of any and all events in the lives of their children so that both parents may participate 
and support the children in said events. 
e. Notice to Move. If either party intends to move from Sevier Couinty, that parent 
shall provide to the other parent sixty (60) days advance written notice. 
f. Communication. All communication between the parties shall be via e-mail. 
However, this rule shall not apply to urgent or emergency situations. During these types of 
situations, telephone contact is appropriate and accepted. 
g. Religious Ordinances. Petitioner has the first right to perform all LDS religious 
3 
ordinances for the minor children, so long as he is deemed worthy by his ecclesiastical leaders to 
do so. 
h Encourage Visitation. The court instructs the parties to be aware that parenting 
time with the visiting parent is not the children's choice, nor should the children be given the 
choice as to whether or not they can or should be allowed to exercise parenting time. The 
Respondent is required to encourage the children and simply deliver the children for purposes of 
parenting time with the Petitioner. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent are admonished that 
the children should be ready to be delivered, as well as returned at the designated times, pursuant 
to statute. Both parties shall respect and accommodate the needs of their daughter, Melissa, as it 
relates to her extra-curricular activities and schedule. However, Melissa's schedule does not 
minimize her need to have regular and scheduled parenting time with her father. Reasonable and 
minor alternations to parenting time can be made with the assistance of the Special master 
7. Petitioner and Respondent are each awarded one-half of each and every summer 
with the minor children in the following manner. 
a. The parties are entitled to two (2) week blocks with the minor children 
which will alternate between them for the duration of the summer. Summer parenting time will 
be subject to normal and statutory parenting time by the non-custodial parent (i.e weekend 
visitation). However, one (1) week prior to the commencement of school, the children will be 
returned to the Respondent in order to prepare for school. 
b. Each party is entitled to one (1) uninterrupted two (2) week block of time 
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with the minor children. However, in order to exercise this uninterrupted parenting time with the 
children, that party must notify the Special Master in writing no later than May 15th each and 
every year. 
8. In accordance with UCA § 78-45-7.16, each parent is to share equally the 
responsibility for child care expenses incurred for work related and/or education required to keep 
the Respondent's nursing degree on behalf of the minor children: 
a. If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent is to begin paying 
his/her share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care 
expense, but if they child care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making 
monthly pa>ments of that expense while it is not being incurred without obtaining a modification 
of the child support order. 
b. A parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide written verification 
of the costs and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a 
provider and thereafter upon the request of the other parent. 
c. The parent shall notify the other parent if any change of child care provider 
or the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of the change. The 
parent incurring child care expenses shall be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or 
to recover from the other parties share of the expenses if the parent incurring the expenses fails to 
notify the other parent within said 30 days. 
9. However, each party is ordered to provide first option to their co-parent to provide 
5 
any day care needs for the children. This rule applies to all situations in which either parent needs 
to lea\e the children for more than one and a half (1 l/2) hours. 
10. It is reasonable and proper that both parties are required to maintain in effect a 
policy of dental, health, and accident insurance at all times that such may be available through 
their respective employers at a reasonable cost with the minor children named beneficiaries 
thereunder. Further, each party is ordered to pay one-half ( /4) of any premiums, deductible 
amounts, co-payments, and one-half ( Vi) of all non-covered medical and dental expenses 
(including, but not limited to, accidents, surgery, orthodontics, ophthalmology, optometry 
[including eyeglasses], cavities/fillings, psychological and or psychiatric care, hospitalization, 
broken limbs, physical therapy, continuing illnesses, allergies, etc.) for said minor children. 
11. A parent who incurs medical expenses is to provide written verification of the cost 
and payment of the expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
12. Each party is ordered to reimburse the other party within 30 days for his or her 
share of any medical or dental expense that has been paid by the other party that are not covered 
by health insurance for the children. 
13. The custodial parent is ordered to provide a copy of the Decree of Divorce to each 
creditor providing medical or dental services for the minor children. Pursuant to UCA § 15-4-6.7 
(1953), each creditor is to be notified by the custodial parent that the creditor is prohibited from 
making claim for unpaid medical expenses against a parent who has paid in full that share of the 
medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. Each 
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creditor receiving a copy of the Decree of Divorce is to be notified that the creditor is prohibited 
from making a negative credit report or report of debtor's repayment practices or credit history 
rcgaiwMi.. a [ - • i . . . . \penses required to 
be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. 
JIJ, rnoncN in lU unldren s accounts are to be used for their purposes. Whichever 
party controls the account, they must give the other party notice of the 1 ise c; )f those .11 inds. 
'Those funds and accounts described by Mr. Sheffield and the $32,000 accounts 
rcvi . . . . . . : .csend.es ana Ir, 
Resendes has no right, title or interest in them, at all, or the $100 a month that they generate, it is 
simply inheritance. 
I he parties h.i1 • \ i;n ilated two (2) retirement ace :)i n its :h u ii lg tl i ,ri.t I I lai I iage, 
the 40 IK and the 457 accounts. Mr. Resendes is to prepare and pay for the preparation of the two 
(. \, •. - .- >piiiLiiig me u \ o U) accounts 50/50 as of the date ol liiL- uno rcc . Any costs, 
incurred, other than for preparation, will be split 50/50. 
1 n
 The Respondent is awarded the family home, along with its debt. The undisputed 
equity will be split 50/50. Mr. Resendes' equity will not garner any interest, but is to be paid 
i ipoi i tl :ie I ii st of tl n :; folio vv ii ig e ;ei. its: if tl I ::  1 ionic is sold; if I vlrs. Resendes moves from the 
home, cohabitates, remarries; or, when the youngest child turns 18 years of age. Mrs. Resendes is 
allowed to refinance the home to reduce the interest rate of 7.75%. This is a one time event that 
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will not trigger the equity payment and the refinance is limited to only the existing debt. 
18. The family duplex is awarded to Mr. Resendes along with its debt. The 
undisputed value is $120,000, with a debt of $101,025, leaving a net equity o f$ 18,975. which 
will be split 50/50 between the parties. Mrs. Resendes' equit) will be paid upon the first of the 
following events: if it is sold; if Petitioner moves from his side he is living on; remarries, 
cohabitates; or, when the youngest child turns 18 years of age. No interest will accrue on Mrs 
Resendes' equity. The Court will allow Mr. Resendes to refinance the existing debt to get it 
down to a reasonable interest rate from the 9% he is paying now. This is a one time event that 
will not trigger the equity payment to Mrs. Resendes, but the refinance is limited to only the 
existing debt. If Mr. Resendes refinances more than the existing debt, then he is obligated to pay 
Mrs. Resendes her equity. 
19. The joint Discover Card debt was accumulated during a pre-child support order 
period and there is a dispute as to how much Mr. Resendes paid Mrs. Resendes during that 
period. The Court finds in September the parties agreed the child support would be $1,700 per 
month, which even taking Mr. Resendes" view on how much he paid, he had not been paying 
Mrs. Resendes $1,700 per month. Consequently, the Court is assigning this debt to Mr. 
Resendes. The debt was for items purchased for family necessities and needs, they were not 
splurges. The Court is also assigning Mr. Resendes the Net Bank account money that appears he 
has raided to the tune of at least $100, but whatever he has taken, he does not need to pay it back, 
but he can use the remaining funds to help pay the joint Discover Card debt. 
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20. The parties have agreed to a personal property division that the Court approves 
based upon the stipulation of the parties, as modified and as per the exhibits offered. Each of the 
parties rr~ mvnrdH th< ^ e items of personal property. 
The Suburban has a value of $5,090 and is awarded to Mrs. Resendes. The 
Cara\ ...: :,.;. .u r-v5"-'. • awarder K- ;•::. Kesendes. 
22. The AmeriTrade Account is awarded to Mr. Resendes. It appears that a lot of stuff 
was going on with that account with the transfers and changes to the account and it appears to the 
< 'mil i ilii,mi, Ifinv is approxnirili IN SI ri"7,1^ in llv .i« c< • 
23. 'Ihe Court has consciously awarded more in value of the martial property accounts 
•vjsendcs because me v ^urt is going to order that Mr. Resendes pay the custody 
evaluation and the appraisal costs. The Court is finding specifically that Mrs. Resendes does not 
have THE ability to pay anything towards these two (2) debts. Mrs. Resendes does not even have 
f ^ "•' . • ^  a e : i n g 
Mr. Resendes to pay these debts. 
ne i i L.:i ,iiki aiat /,:,. Resendes has been investing in what has been identified 
as the Investment Club Partnership Account. He did this before the separation and s!iu .- the 
separation, taking either a $100 or $125 per month and investing it into this account. It appears 
tl lat tl lei e is approximately $5, 300 ii i tl le accoi int. at tl lis tini 2. It appeal s to tl le Cc i u I: tl lat gi ven 
the financial situation of these parties, Mr. Resendes' investing is a splurge, it's something that 
tuese parties cannot anord. i KL L ourt specifically tniu;, inc^ Kinds to be a marital asset and it 
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should be split 50/50. 
25. Mrs. Resendes has not got the ability to pay for her attorney's fees. However, she 
should pay a portion of her fees. She has had to go out and borrow funds from her familj to pay 
her fees while Mr. Resendes has been out accumulating a $5,300 interest in his Investment Club 
Partnership. Consequently, the Court finds that Mr. Resendes has a greater ability to pay fees 
than Mrs. Resendes and that he should be ordered to pay $2,650 for her attorney's fees. Whether 
Mr. Resendes wants to cash in his share of the $5,300 investment club funds, he should be 
allowed to do so. Mr. Resendes has substantial attorney's fees, but the Court is of the opinion 
that the money Mr. Resendes used to invest should have gone to his attorney's fees or for the 
support of the family, it simply was a splurge. Mr. Resendes shall have 120 days from today's 
date to pay those fees. At the expiration of the 120 days, Mrs. Resendes should be awarded 
judgment in the sum of the $2,650 which shall garner interest at the statutory rate until paid in 
full. 
26. Mr. Resendes clearly has the greater ability to earn income and the Court is 
awarding three (3) children to him for tax dependencies; the first, third, and fifth child. The 
Respondent is awarded two (2) of the children as tax dependencies; the second and fourth child. 
Either party can purchase the exemptions from the other party so long as the party is held 
harmless from the purchase. For the year 2003, this split does apply and the parties can file 
jointly or separately. If the parties see that they can save money by filing jointly for 2003 and 
they agree on it, then they are allowed to do so because they were still married in 2003. The 
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Court is not ordering them to do so. but if it is advantageous to them to file jointly and they both 
agree to do so. then they Court will allow it. However, Mr. Resendes is totally responsible and 
V .h<< R e ^ n d . s i ••• f,.., T - T ; - 1 
n regards to the parties" incomes, the Court finds the following. Mr. Resendes' 
inconiv. : a.N increased animal: •> small amounts. 1 here!ore, tlie l ,u;rl is linding that has 2003 
income was $67, 467 from his full time employment or $5,622 per month. For Mrs. Resendes 
it's a whole lot tougher. Even though the parties agreed that Mrs. Resendes should stay at home 
In uisr ihr cliililn n tliul • itiini n i _^
 :_ >i!;r . „<NL-IKK->> -^  M-.MI^  as a 
massage therapist for which there appears to be little or no call for these skills.in this area. Mrs. 
Resendes however does have skills as a nurse and it appears there is some need for these skills in 
this area. Mrs. Resendes has never worked more than part-time for at least (1^ sa-
of this marriage. She still has a pre-age school child for which she should be able to provide care. 
('misetinrnlb lli' i ii I umg !u oitlei Mi.s Kcscude.s m \wu k lull-lime, but she can work 
part-time. Historically, there is evidence that she was able to earn $400 a month, but that was 
some time ago. Minimum wage is $890 a month and she is clearly qualified to do more than 
minimum wage type of work. 1 estimony is that a starting wage for a r.ur- v- l-1 f> M() IV; 
The Court finds that is would be reasonable for Mrs. Resendes to work 72 hours per month at 
— < '- '!•- jeneiaie 
$1,195 per month. The Court is going to impute $1,200 to Mrs. Resendes as income which is 
essentia^, a lkui-time nurse's income. 1 his is three (3) times her historical income, but given her 
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abilities, training, and the local job market, the Court finds that this part-time income of $1,200 
to Mrs. Resendes is reasonable. 
28. For child support puposes. the Court has found that Mr. Resndes earns $5,622 per 
month and imputes $1,200 to Mrs. Resendes, making Mr. Resendes' child support obligation to 
be $1, 638 per month which will begin April 1. 2003. Universal IncomeWithholding does apply 
pursuant to UCA §62A-11-501 (1953 as amended). All payments are to be made through the 
Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84145-0011. This income 
withholding procedure applies to existing and future payors. 
29. For alimony purposes, the court finds that Mr. Resendes earns $ 5, 622 per month 
and takes in $650 for rents, for total monthly income of $6,272. For alimony purposes, the Court 
has imputed $1,200 per month to Mrs. Resendes, plus a $100 per month in inheritance, for a total 
of $1,300 per month. 
30. For alimony, the Court needs to look at expenses. Mrs. Resendes has her monthly 
expenses illustrated on Exhibit 1. These expenses appear to be reasonable and necessary except 
for school lunches, that it appears she is not paying, so the Court finds her monthly needs and 
expenses to be $3,752. Mr. Resendes' monthly expenses were given orally to the Court and they 
are as follows: $1,200 per month for mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the duplex; $125 for 
telephone; electricity $100; car insurance $50; gas for car $100; clothes $50; food $250; drill 
team $17 per month; medicals $20; house maintenance $50; gifts $25; yard maintenance and 
dues $50; entertainment $20; hair $15; car maintenance $20; and tithing $292, for a total of 
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$42,389. the court does not normally include tithing in its monthly need calculation, not because 
it has anything against i t , but because it is a voluntary contribution. However. I'm including it in 
both of t ivr . K\ U'M* :' j *ase. 
3 I. Hie Court needs to now look at Mr. Resendes' tax liability for his full-time 
ei i lpk >yi iieiil as they relate to I lis monthly expenses, in ._Ui^. \i; Kesendes earned $67,467 and 
had $8, 388 taken out for taxes. that works out to be 12.5% according to Exhibit ^ Mr.-.wx IT, 
Exhibit 23 is a pay-stub for December 15-28 of 2002, which shows he only took out 8% for taxes 
at a til. i IC ' -'hen they ha«" l^^- '^nted I'm i mi inn mill i in i "sondes i nihil i I 
illustrates that if he were awarded three (3) of the child tax exemptions, he states his effective tax 
K; ' . -..* . . . i nc cuun :. .A>, mat lor me zuuj tax year, he took out 12.5" o lor taxes, which 
is too much and it should have been 8%. Consequently, the Court finds thai S" . m . ine is 
needed for monthly tax expense in the sum of $502. I find that his net after tax income for 
aliiiini i\ pulpites is %^ ,770 pn month. 
32. fo calculate the alimony in this case, the Court finds Mrs. Resendes has $1,200 in 
iiilputed income, l • '•{; ;ur innentance, and $1,638 1or child support, for a total of $2,938. 
Subtracting this figure from her monthly needs of $3,752, the Court finds her y 
need of $814 per month. Mr. Resendes has a total net income of $5,770, less $1,638 for child 
of SI.743, which substantially exceeds Mrs. Resendes; necessary and reasonable alimony need of 
!>A ; -k i nc L ourt specifically iiiids that Mr. Kesends has the income and assets to pay the debts I 
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have awarded him above, plus a portion of Mrs. Resendes attorney's fees, the custody evaluator. 
and the appraisals because the Court is not going to take anything above, Mrs. Resendes' alimony 
need of $814 per month. The Court specifically finds he has the ability to pay the debts awarded 
to him, his monthly expenses, and alimony of $814 per month and the Court awards Mrs. 
Resendes the same. The Court awards Mrs. Resendes said alimony for the length of the marriage 
(July 2, 1986 to July 9, 2004), or until the Respondent remarries, cohabitates, or dies, whichever 
occurs first. 
33. Consequently, the Court is awarding Mrs. Resendes $1,638 per month in child 
support and $814 per month in alimony, for a total of $2,452 per month, which should begin 
April 1,2004. 
34. The parties should exchange the personal property awarded to them by April 30, 
2004. Mr. Resendes should bring a law enforcement officer if he goes to Mrs. Resendes' 
residence to retrieve his property. 
35. Mrs. Resendes is to look for the original insurance policies and if she has them, 
she should deliver them to Mr. Resendes by April 30, 2004. However, if Mrs. Resendes can 
transfer the policy she has been paying on into her name, she should be allowed to do so. 
36. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, both parties are ordered to each carry 
$100,000.00 of life insurance on their lives, while the children are minors, and designate the 
children as the beneficiaries of these policies. 
37. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are 
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required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
38. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued 
herein, that party will iv h;:! •• •' ,: ..lthr.,.-.. : :^ < :(k-^ .mJ 
Court costs incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce. 
3C). I" In piiiln. • I Miipk'lul l he divorce education course for parents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 i ins Conn has jurisdiction over the parties in the above-entitled matter, and the 
parties are entitled to n d"- 01. ••-. "m-nds of irreconnlnhie diilnviin^ 
2 The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, to become absolute and final, 
Auui\w .. me oaie c: . ..._. X Ji{-4. 
3. Fhe Court concludes that all other issues of dispute have been resolve 
Court pursuant to the above Findings of Fact 
~7 H'WcH 
:
*iM>ov!;n x 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Respondent 
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 7 
OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO RESPONDENT AND HER COUNSEL, DOUGLAS L. NEELEY: 
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that this Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Petitioner 
shall be the Order of the Court unless >ou file an objection in writing within five (5) days 
from the date of the service of this notice. 
DATED and signed this / !_ day of *J% _ , 2005 
LORIE D/EOV^LKE C< ^ 
brPetit Attorney fo titioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this • | day of January, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, 
to: 
Douglas L. Neeley, 
Ist South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642. 
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Addendum 2 
\'Tii r-' 
<'••. •• i* r u n f: • o , r . f i 
A 
LORIED.FOWLKE, 6875 
PAUL WALDRON 7660 
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C. 
2696 No. University Ave., Ste. 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
^
!
"
VIIK ( < > " \ n . s i \ !L < Ail 
ROBERT RESENDES, 
AMENDED DECREE OF 
r>T^ORCE 
vs. 
T-\i\ lAKAJUi KLSLNDLS, Case No. 
Judge: 
Respondent. 
024600138 
I he above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 2 day of April, 2004, the Honorable 
Judge PaulD. L>" ^-. • i i ' M i i r . h» v ft i ^ Nrnnfirni 'ippcared m po1 •. w ,h ;.. in ;'>ei;:ca ' -\ ner 
attorney, Douglas L. Neeley. I he Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by his 
attorney, •" * :ia\ UIL received and accepted the parties' partial 
stipulation, having received the sworn testimony of witnesses and other evidence, having heard 
aiguinchi oi counsel, and Den., .nerwise lully advised in the premises, and entered its Findings 
of Fact & Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
)"V<\ L L. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract heretofor existing by and 
between the Petitioner and Respondent be, and the same are hereby dissolved, and the parties are 
hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce one from the other, said Decree to become absolute and 
final upon entry by the Court herein, and effective as of July 8, 2004. 
2. There have been five (5) children born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Melissa 
Joy, born January 13, 1988; Elysha Briana, born May 4, 1990; Lauren Taylor, born September 
13, 1994; Aubriana Tess, born April 1, 1997; and Annaliese Corrine, born July 14, 1999. 
3. The Court adopts and incorporates the orders regarding custody and visitation 
from the Order Pursuant To Stipulation (Hearing Date: September 15, 2003) wherein the parties 
are awarded the joint legal custody of the partie's minor children. The Respondent is designated 
as the primary residential parent for the children in regards to parenting time. 
4. The Petitioner is entitled to parenting time pursuant to the statutory guidelines, 
which includes every other weekend, mid-week visits and alternating holidays. 
a. Special Days. The parties' stipulated and the Court orders up to eight (8) potential 
additional "special visitation" or "special event" days. These additional days shall be at the direction 
of the Special Master. 
b. Lunch Dates with Dad. Petitioner is awarded alternating lunch with one (1) of the 
children at school, so long as it does not interfere with the school curriculum. If Petitioner plans to 
remove that child from the school during the lunch hour for a special lunch, he should notify the 
Respondent prior to doing so. 
c. Telephone Contact with Children. The non-custodial parent shall be entitled to 
reasonable telephone contact with the minor children. During the school year and Respondent's one-
h in - .: . 'JCI L>U CKS. I'ciiuonci sliall be entitled to call the children a couple times per week (2-3). 
However, all phone calls shall be prior to 9:00 |» in ,ni"l Irnl ! I" el ,i i< nsonahlc iliiuliuii 
Likewise, Respondent shall be entitled to this same telephone contact with the minor children during 
tliose tii nes that the childi en ai i : > itli Petitioner foi his one halt si in liner blocks. I lie children shall 
be entitled to call either parent at any time as they desire and neither party shall prohibit or limit the 
.. tuition, if Petitioner so desires, he may purchase a cell phone for the 
exclusive use of the children so that they may contact him whrm \ r\ or ^herrver ill, , n I , 
d Events of Children. Each party shall be ordered to notify the other parent in 
advance of an> and all ^ -irei its ii i tl le lives :)f their children so that both parents may participate 
and support the children in said events. 
e Notice to Move. If either party intends to move from Sevier Couinty, that parent 
shall provide to the other parent sixty (60) days advance written in 1 iu-
I Communication. All communication between the parties shall be via e-mail. 
However, this - ' f^ <; !ft 'n-^ *1'-' •*» ^m.•»•"•*' .i.i„un . - mug mese types of 
situations, telephone contact is appropriate and accepted. 
g. Religious Ordinances. rcu-oecr has m^ iu*st right to perlbrm all LDS religious 
ordinances for the minor children, so long as he is deemed worthy by his ecclesinstval le.uleiN to 
do so. 
h. Encourage Visitation. The, • ; . u-ti , . . t(1 -^ 
time with the visiting parent is not the children's choice, nor should the children be given the 
<'hi>" -1 - * ix u-%"'- ' • ID or should be allowed to exercise parenting time. The 
Respondent is required to encourage the children and simply deliver the children ft-r numoM's of 
parenting time with the Petitioner. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent are admonished that 
the children should be ready to be delivered, as well as returned at the designated times, pursuant 
to statute. Both parties shall respect and accommodate the needs of their daughter, Melissa, as it 
relates to her extra-curricular activities and schedule. However, Melissa's schedule does not 
minimize her need to have regular and scheduled parenting time with her father. Reasonable and 
minor alternations to parenting time can be made with the assistance of the Special master. 
These additional days shall be at the direction of the Special Master. Both parties are to 
respect and accommodate the needs of their daughter, Melissa, as it relates to her extra curricular 
activities and schedule. However, Melissa's schedule does not minimize her need to have regular 
and scheduled parenting time with her need to have regular and scheduled parenting time with 
her father. Reasonable and minor alterations to parenting time can be made with the assistance of 
the Special Master. 
5. Petitioner and Respondent are each awarded one-half of each and every summer 
with the minor children in the following manner. 
a. The parties are entitled to two (2) week blocks with the minor children 
which will alternate between them for the duration of the summer. Summer parenting time will 
be subject to normal and statutory parenting time by the non-custodial parent (i.e weekend 
visitation). However, one (1) week prior to the commencement of school, the children will be 
returned to the Respondent in order to prepare for school. 
b. Each party is entitled to one (1) uninterrupted two (2) week block of time 
with the minor children. However, in order to exercise this uninterrupted parenting time with the 
children, that party must notify the Special Master in writing no later than May 15n each and 
every year. 
6. In accordance with UCA § 78-45-7.16, each p a i v 
responsibility for child care expenses incurred for work related and/or education required to keep 
the Respondent's nursing clcjjnv (in h^lv»,*'«'r"tl '• K 
If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent is to begin paying 
b'1* h*-' • •• • •' tincjiaieiy upon presentation of proof of the child care 
expense, but if they child care expense ceases to be incurred, that p nvrt •;• .- -^ n- »>,i
 m a ;MlJ 
monthly payments of that expense while it is not being incurred without obtaining a modification 
of the child support order. 
\ 4 parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide written verification 
*:<*««• -^ '*"'* ;*1'M'- .*. •. , i v IULT M UIL ,-mer parent upon initial engagement of a 
provider and thereafter upon the request of the other parent. 
c lie parent shall notify the other parent if any change of child care provider 
or the monthly expense of child care within 30 r.i^nJ.!- ] -p ^ . n i!-- • *: 
parent incurring child care expenses shall be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or 
to *vi o* <• '• ••• f; "!» • ••: .,} ' '; -^ L-.\pciiNcs n die parent incurring the expenses fails to 
notify the other parent within said 30 days. 
7. i iuwever, each paiiy is ordered to provide first option to their co-parent to provide 
any day care needs for the children. This rule applies to all situati' 
to leave the children for more than one and a half (1 Vi) hours. 
8. B( J-* ir.>.i - • •••- - u uemal, health, and 
accident insurance at all times that such may be available through their respective employers at a 
rea^onah' ^ . . . -i ...dren named beneficiaries thereunder. Further, each party is 
ordered to pay one-half ( V-i) of any premiums, deductible anio nn K MI p.ivinrnP, and niic-li.nll ( 
Vi ) of all non-covered medical and dental expenses (including, but not limited to, accidents, 
surgery, orthodontics, ophthalmology, optometry [including eyeglasses], cavities/fillings, 
psychological and or psychiatric care, hospitalization, broken limbs, physical therapy, continuing 
illnesses, allergies, etc.) for said minor children. 
9. A parent who incurs medical expenses is to provide written verification of the cost 
and payment of the expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
10. Each party is ordered to reimburse the other party within 30 days for his or her 
share of any medical or dental expense that has been paid by the other party that are not covered 
by health insurance for the children. 
11. The custodial parent is ordered to provide a copy of the Decree of Divorce to each 
creditor providing medical or dental services for the minor children. Pursuant to UCA § 15-4-6.7 
(1953), each creditor is to be notified by the custodial parent that the creditor is prohibited from 
making claim for unpaid medical expenses against a parent who has paid in full that share of the 
medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. Each 
creditor receiving a copy of the Decree of Divorce is to be notified that the creditor is prohibited 
from making a negative credit report or report of debtor's repayment practices or credit history 
regarding a parent who has paid in full that share of the medical and dental expenses required to 
be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. 
12. All money in the children's accounts are to be used for their purposes. Whichever 
party controls the account, they must give the other party notice of the use of those funds. 
13. Those funds and accounts described by Mr. Sheffield and the $32,000 accounts 
receivable, that may or may not be recoverable, are inheritance of Mrs. Resendes and Mr. 
Resendes has no right, title or interest in them, at all, or the $100 a month that they generate, it is 
simply inheritance. 
14. The parties have accumulated two (2) retirement accounts during their marriage, 
the 401K and the 457 arm 1» w*-^  ^ i - »., .-i^uie ma pay for the preparation of the two 
(2) QDRO's splitting the two (2) accounts 50/50 as of the date of the divorce. Any costs, 
h1 '•i»' *• * * • . juration, will be spin M) 50. 
15. The Respondent is awarded the family home, a\" • • ! , 
value of the home is $165,000, the debt $72339, leaving an equity amount of $92,661, which 
equity will be split 50/50. Mr ^wendes' ^»y\\\\ w ill nul garnei - _ .merest, nui is to be paid 
upon the first of the following events: if the home is sold; if Mrs. Resendes moves from the 
:
- tbi* •* •••» •
 ;,.e youngest child uun.s i 8 years of age. Mrs. Resendes is 
allowed to refinance the home to reduce the interest rate of 7.75%. 1 his is a one time evei it that 
i rigger me equity payment and the refinance is limited to only the existing debt. 
16. The family duplex is awnnlri1 !« '* r ^end;--. 
undisputed value is $120,000, with a debt of $101,025, leaving a net equity o f$18,975, which 
wili h> : i ^ii *". i KM^ .^ 'tT i :K , .. esendes" equity will be paid upon the first of the 
following events: if it is sold; if Petitioner moves from his side he is living on; remarries, 
t -'iiiihw,.-..->. HI. u uen me youngest child turns 18 years of age. No interest will accrue on Mrs. 
Resendes' equity. The Court will allow Mr. Resendes to *-.'tl"» <>• • N 'Ming JeU ^ L U • 
down to a reasonable interest rate from the 9% he is paying now. This is a one time event that 
vviil not trigger the equit\ n;* ;P.^.»V,I ,
 )IM . : . ^ 1:. limited to only the 
existing debt. If Mr. Resendes refinances more than the existing debt, then he is obligated to pay 
' • • ! • 
- he Petitioner is ordered to assume and p.*\ r • 4 i 
Court is also assigning Mr. Resendes the Net Bank account money from which he can use the 
remaining funds to help pay the joint Discover Card debt. 
18. The parties have agreed to a personal property division that the Court approves 
based upon the stipulation of the parties, as modified and as per the exhibits offered. Each of the 
parties are awarded those items of personal property. 
19. The Suburban has a value of $5,090 and is awarded to Mrs. Resendes. The 
Caravan is valued at $4,000 and is awarded to Mr. Resendes. 
20. The AmeriTrade Account is awarded to Mr. Resendes, in which there is 
approximately $1,950 in the account at the present time. 
21. Mr. Resendes is ordered to pay the custody evaluation and the appraisal costs. 
22. The Investment Club Partnership Account with approximately $5,300 in the 
account at this time is to be split 50/50. 
23. Mr. Resendes is ordered to pay $2,650 for a portion of Mrs. Resendes' attorney's 
fees. Wliether Mr. Resendes wants to cash in his share of the $5, 300 investment club funds, he is 
allowed to do so. Mr Resendes will have 120 days from today's date to pay those fees. If the fees 
are not paid at the expiration of the 120 days, Mrs. Resendes is awarded judgment in the sum of 
the $2,650 which shall garner interest at the statutory rate until paid in full. 
24. Mr. Resendes is awarded three (3) children to him for tax dependencies; the first, 
third, and fifth child. The Respondent is awarded two (2) of the children as tax dependencies; 
the second and fourth child. Either party can purchase the exemptions from the other party so 
long as the party is held harmless from the purchase. For the year 2003, this split does apply and 
the parties can file jointly or separately. If the parties see that they can save money by filing 
jointly for 2003 and they agree on it, then they are allowed to do so because they were still 
married in 2003. The Court is not ordering them to do so, but if it is advantageous to them to file 
jointly and they both agree to do so, then they Court will allow it. However, Mr. Resendes is 
totally responsible and will hold Mrs. Resendes harmless from, any advance received for the 
children in 2003. 
25. For child support puposes, the Court has found that Mr. Resndes earns $5,622 per 
month and imputes $1,200 to Mrs. Resendes, making Mr. Resendes' child support obligation to 
be $1, 638 per month which will begin April 1, 2003. Universal Income Withholding does apply 
pursuant to UCA §62A-11-501 (1953 as amended). All payments are to be made through the 
Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84145-0011. This income 
withholding procedure applies to existing and future payors. 
26. For alimony purposes the court found Mr. Resendes earns $6,272 (including $650 
in rental income) and imputes $1200 plus $100 a month inheritance to Mrs. Resendes. Mrs. 
Resendes is awarded $814 per month in alimony, (with $1638 child support for a total of $2,452 
per month), which will begin April 1, 2004. Alimony is awarded for the length of the marriage 
(July 2, 1986 to July 8, 2004) or until Respondent remarries, cohabitates or dies, which ever 
occurs first. 
27. The parties are ordered to exchange the personal property awarded to them by 
April 30, 2004. Mr. Resendes is to bring a law enforcement officer if he goes to Mrs. Resendes' 
residence to retrieve his property. 
28. Mrs. Resendes is to look for the original insurance policies and if she has them, 
she is ordered to deliver them to Mr. Resendes by April 30, 2004. However, if Mrs. Resendes can 
transfer the policy she has been paying on into her name, she is allowed to do so. 
29. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, both parties are ordered to each carry 
$100,000.00 of life insurance on their lives, while the children are minors, and designate the 
children as the beneficiaries of these policies. 
30. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are 
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
31. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued 
herein, that party will be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and 
Court costs incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce. 
17 /4WA DATED this I / day of JamHH=^2005 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Respondent 
JUDGElfeflL D^LYJvfA 
District Court Judge 
N O T I C E P U R S U A N T TO R U L E 7 
OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO RESPONDENT AND HER COUNSEL, DOUGLAS L. NEELEY: 
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that this Amended Decree of Divorce prepared by the Petitioner shall be the Order of the 
Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5) days from the date of the 
service of this notice. 
DATED and signed this /9day o f Q v . , 2005 
< 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this / / day of January, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing proposed Amended Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to: 
Douglas L. Neeley, 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642. <' 
SEC 
Addendum 3 
§ 30-3-5(8) UTAH CODE (2004) 
30-3-5 (8). 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the 
marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at 
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection 
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable 
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that 
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard 
of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, 
that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in 
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the 
court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and 
awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or both during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and 
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony 
to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered, unless the courts finds extenuating circumstances that justify that 
action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the 
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The Court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The Court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if 
the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of 
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, 
the courts finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for 
a longer period of time. 
Addendum 4 
§§ 78-45-3; 78-45-4 UTAH CODE (2004) 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
(1) Every father shall support his child and every child shall be presumed to 
be in need of the support of his father. Every man shall support his wife when she 
is in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-
7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable 
and necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable 
upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses 
described in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
78-45-4. Duty of Woman. 
(1) Every woman shall support her child and every child shall be presumed to 
be in need of the support of his mother. Every woman shall support her husband 
when he is in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-
7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable 
and necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessitites are chargeable 
upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both prents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses 
described in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
Addendum 5 
§ 78-45-7.5(6) and (7) UTAH CODE (2004) 
78-45-7.5 (6) and (7). 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7) 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to 
the amount imputed, the party defaults, or in contested cases, a hearing is held and 
a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. | 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same 
occupations in the same geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, 
income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work 
week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the 
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of 
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor 
children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent 
can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
